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THE HONORABLE JUDGE GEORGE HOWARD, JR.-A LIFE OF
COURAGE AND CIVILITY IN THE LAW
J. Thomas Sullivan*
Judge Howard was an Arkansas legal pioneer. In 1954, he became one
of the first black graduates from the University of Arkansas School of
Law. For much of the next twenty-five years, Judge Howard practiced
law in Pine Bluff, Arkansas andjourneyed into courtrooms throughout
Arkansas to valiantly represent persons who were striving to overcome
economic, racial, and social injustice. I
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 27, 2006, United States District Judge George Howard, Jr.
was honored by the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bo-
wen School of Law with the announcement of a distinguished professorship
created in his honor. Judge Howard spoke briefly at the ceremony. His
words were, as we would expect, thoughtfully chosen, and his remarks were
delivered in the deliberate style of a jurist who was always mindful that his
comments and observations carried with them the weight of his office and
his personal integrity. His softly-voiced message that day reflected his en-
during respect for others, for the duties we owe to the law, to our country
and community, and for his personal faith.
Less than a year later, Judge Howard died, on April 21, 2007, at the age
of eighty-two. He was laid to rest in his hometown of Pine Bluff, Arkansas,
where he and his wife, Vivian, and their family spent their lives, as leaders
in their church2 and their community.
* Judge George Howard, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas
at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. I want to thank UALR Bowen Law School
Law Librarians, Kathryn Fitzhugh-who served as Judge Howard's law clerk following her
graduation from UALR Bowen School of Law-and Melissa Serfass for their assistance in
obtaining records of The Chicago Defender. I also want to thank Judge Howard's longtime
law clerk, Judy Lansky, who read and commented on this article. I hope this short tribute,
barely an introduction to the life and career of Judge Howard, will find his wife, Vivian
Smith Howard, and his long-time secretary, Veloria Watley, in good health and even better
spirits.
1. In the Matter of the Death of Judge George Howard, Jr., (Ark. Ct. App. May 9,
2007) (per curiam), available at http://courts.state.ar.us/opinions/20070509.htm.
2. Judge Howard and his wife of sixty years, Vivian, were lifelong members of New
Town Missionary Baptist Church in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, where he was remembered at a
memorial service on April 28, 2007, a year and a day after he spoke at the Bowen Law
UALR LAW REVIEW
II. JUDGE HOWARD THE ADVOCATE: CHAMPIONING THE CAUSE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS
Judge Howard's career in the law extended over half a century, and it is
fittingly a career in which his service was divided between his representa-
tion of clients as a practitioner in Pine Bluff and his service to the people
and the Constitution as a United States District Judge. Following graduation
from the University of Arkansas School of Law,3 he entered a private prac-
tice in which he undertook the full range of difficult cases confronted by any
lawyer in a smaller community. He championed the causes of equality be-
fore the law, civil rights, and racial justice in his representation of individual
clients and in major litigation initiatives. Judge Howard earned the respect
of his community and the legal profession with his courage and dedication
to the highest standards for competent and ethical representation, being hon-
ored by the Arkansas Bar Association for distinguished service in the pursuit
ofjustice in 2003. 4
Judge Howard's career in private practice did not offer the luxury or
security that lawyers may regularly expect as members of the Bar. In the
United States and the State of Arkansas in the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, issues of equal justice and racial discrimination were not polite debat-
ing points focusing on political correctness. Instead, this country-
particularly in the southern states-remained gripped by the pernicious ef-
fects of institutionalized discrimination and de facto racism. The nation was
still coming to grips with the legacy of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and
Jim Crow-forced segregation. Moreover, despite the unresolved issues of
segregation and discrimination, many black Americans served in the Armed
Forces during the Second World War, an experience shared by Judge How-
School on the occasion of the announcement of the Howard Professorship by Bowen Law
School Dean Charles W. Goldner.
3. Judge Howard graduated from the University of Arkansas School of Law in 1954.
See Press Release, University of Arkansas School of Law, Professors, Alumni Win Arkansas
Bar Awards, (July 17, 2003), available at
http://law.uark.edu/news/news-archives/2003_news/professorsalumni win arkansas bar a
wards. The Chicago Defender reported in its October 18, 1952 issue that "George Howard,
27, Pine Bluff, elected president of dormitory at University of Arkansas." At a Glance For
Busy Readers, CHI. DEFENDER, Oct. 18, 1952, at 2. The Defender is an African American
newspaper which published daily, national, and weekend editions; the national edition, for
instance, was published from 1921 through 1967. It currently also publishes an online edi-
tion: http://www.chicagodefender.com/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2007). For background informa-
tion on the Chicago Defender, see generally Newspapers: The Chicago Defender,
http://www.pbs.org/blackpress/newsbios/defender.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007); Chica-
go Defender, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChicagoDefender (last visited Aug.
25, 2007). The archives of the Chicago Defender may be accessed at the Arkansas State
Library.
4. Press Release, University of Arkansas School of Law, supra note 3.
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ard, complete with its own racially-discriminatory experiences that led him
to assume a leadership position in the fight for political equality and public
civility.
5
Judge Howard might have moved to one of the cities of the North upon
graduating from law school and found a lucrative law practice without the
persistent reminders of official and unofficial discrimination in his life and
the life of his family. He might well have enjoyed a much more convenient
and serene life as an attorney in Chicago, or even St. Louis. But he chose to
return to his home, to Pine Bluff, where he would fight for the cause of jus-
tice and stand against the cause of hatred. He served as president of the local
NAACP chapter, then succeeded Daisy Gatson Bates as president of the
state organization in 1961.6
The United States Supreme Court's decisions dictated change,7 almost
overnight, in beautifully worded and idealistic opinions that brought down
the walls of legal discrimination, 9 while at the same time conceding that
change in individual and collective attitudes could not be forced upon the
country by judicial decisions alone.' 0 The goal of social justice-the fulfill-
5. For a very personal and touching article about Judge Howard's service as a Seabee
in the United States Navy during World War II, see Bill Wilson and Beth Deere, Seabees
Service in the Second World War: A Judge in the Making, 42 ARK. LAW. 20 (2007).
6. Daisy Bates Steps Down as NAACP Head, Cn. DAILY DEFENDER (Daily Edition),
Dec. 4, 1961, at 6.
7. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) ("Brown T').
8. The Brown I Court concluded, succinctly and powerfully: "We conclude that in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 495. In reviewing implementation of its deci-
sion in Brown I, the Court directed a year later that desegregation of the public schools
should proceed with all deliberate speed. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955) ("Brown IX').
9. As the Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public re-
sponsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to ad-
just normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
10. For instance, in Brown II, the Court considered the need for some degree of flexibili-
ty in the implementation of its holding in Brown I, necessitated by practical problems imped-
ing immediate application of remedies to achieve equality in public education, such as inade-
quacy of existing facilities and transportation systems requiring some reasonable delay in
implementation. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300-01.
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ment of the promise of the right of all Americans to "due process and equal
protection of the law"--however, could not be won by even the strongest
wording in a unanimous opinion," nor could the battle for civil rights and
political equality be won by the 10 1st Airborne Division.'
2
A. Fighting Segregation in Dollarway
The civil rights cause, ultimately, had to be fought in every city and
every town. It was fought by citizens committed to extending the promises
of the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution to all
Americans and by lawyers like George Howard, Jr., who faithfully pursued
justice on behalf of their clients in the lower courts of this country,
representing their clients in the face of institutionalized racial prejudice.
In Pine Bluff, Judge Howard undertook through litigation the job,
mandated by the Supreme Court in its decisions in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, of pressing the constitutional commitment for equality in public edu-
cation.'3 He won an initial, decisive victory in the United States District
Court in Dove v. Parham,14 in which the court-despite holding that the
Arkansas Pupil Placement Act of 195915 was not facially unconstitution-
al' 6-- concluded:
11. See e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (rejecting claims by Arkansas and
Little Rock public officials that threats to public safety from forced desegregation of Little
Rock public schools warranted delay in enforcement of desegregation orders). For a succinct
and engaging account of the desegregation crisis, see generally Tony Freyer, Enforcing
Brown in the Little Rock Crisis, 6 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 67 (2004). Professor Freyer's
account includes references to scholarly critiques of the Little Rock crisis and judicial re-
sponse to the intransigence of Little Rock and Arkansas authorities to desegregation orders.
12. Freyer, supra note 11, at 69. President Dwight Eisenhower ordered the 101st Air-
borne Division was to Little Rock to support the United States Marshals charged with enforc-
ing the District Court's order for desegregation of the Little Rock public schools.
13. See 3 Sue to Enroll in Ark. School, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER (Daily Edition), Feb. 9,
1959, at 5. The news account reported that George Howard, "an attorney from Pine Bluff,"
had sued the Dollarway Consolidated School District No. 2, which was not part of the Pine
Bluff School District, and that Pine Bluff had "called off its integration plan, originally set to
start in September, 1958, after rioting broke out at Central High School in Little Rock." Id.
Arkansas statutes requiring segregation in public education were held unconstitutional in
Hoxie Sch. Dist. v. Brewer, 137 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956), ajfd, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir.
1956).
14. 176 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ark. 1959) ("Dove F'), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 271 F.2d
132 (8th Cir. 1959).
15. Act 461 of the General Assembly of Arkansas (1959).
16. Dove I, 176 F. Supp. at 245-47. The court noted that a three-judge panel had held
prior legislative acts supplementing the Pupil Assignment Act of 1956 unconstitutional in
Aaron v. McKinney. Id. at 247, n.5 (citing Aaron v. Cooper, 173 F. Supp. 944,950 (E.D. Ark.
1959)).
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Under this record it is conclusively established, that the superin-
tendents and the officers of the defendant school district and its
Board of Directors, throughout the three school years when the
plaintiffs, Earnestine Dove, James Edwards Warfield and Corliss
Smith, sought admission to the white schools in the district, before
that time and since, have had and continue to have and through its
superintendents and other managing personnel, have carried into
effect, enforced and maintained, a rigid, racial segregation policy
in all of its schools, which, without exception, permitted no entry
of any colored child into its white schools. It is established, too,
that the Board intends a continuation of that policy, without any
change or modifications and that its professing of the Pupil
Enrollment Act of 1956 having been applied and in operation dur-
ing the years 1957, 1958 and 1959, is but a cover-up to conceal its
anti-racial and pro-racial segregation attitude.
These are the facts. The record permits no other conclusion.
17
The district court's order was issued on July 31, 1959, and appealed by
both sides. While the matter was pending in the Eighth Circuit, on an expe-
dited docket, registration for the 1959-60 school year commenced.' 8 A key
issue in the district court's decision had been the school district's argument
that the plaintiffs had not exhausted available administrative remedies for
registration. While the trial court concluded that further exhaustion of those
remedies would have been futile, the Eighth Circuit held otherwise,1 9 based
in part on testimony by the President of the School Board that he intended to
17. Dove, 176 F. Supp. at 249-50. Judge Howard's co-counsel in Dove was Robert L.
Carter of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Id. at 243. Carter, who presented the oral argu-
ment in Brown I, was later appointed to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, where he continues his service. For a biographical note on Judge Cart-
er, see generally Robert L. Carter, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert L. Carter
(last visited Aug. 27, 2007). Legendary Arkansas lawyer Herschel Friday, Jr., was co-counsel
for the school district. Dove 1, 176 F. Supp. at 243.
18. 2nd Ark. Strife Area Begins Registration, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER (Daily Edition),
Aug. 26, 1959, at 2. The Dollarway schools had apparently been a focal point for resistance
to desegregation for many in the segregationist movement. See NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE
CITIZEN'S COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-64, at
97 (1994). The author notes that Dollarway was described as the "last redoubt" in Arkansas's
battle for race purity by "various segregationists." See also, Neil R. McMillen, White Citi-
zens' Council and Resistance to School Desegregation in Arkansas, 30 ARK. HIST. Q. 95, 120
(1971).
19. Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959). The court of appeals announced its
opinion from the bench on September 21, 1959, reserving the option to file its formal opinion
later. It issued its opinion on October 8, 1959. Dove v. Parham, 181 F. Supp. 504, 509 (E.D.
Ark. 1960) ("Dove 1'), aff'd, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1960).
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admit any student applying for admission found to be qualified "without
regard to race."2°
Following the remand that included the circuit court's directive that an
injunction against further maintenance of a system of segregated public
schools, 2' the Dollarway system administered physical and intelligence tests
to the three student-plaintiffs who applied for admission to previously se-
gregated, all-white schools, and had a psychiatrist and an educational psy-
chologist interview them.22 The three students were found unqualified for
transfer, and their applications were denied. They returned to court, filing a
supplemental complaint contemplated by the circuit court's order.24 Chief
Judge Henley25 was now presiding over the case, rather than Judge Beck,
26
who had delivered the forceful condemnation of segregationist sentiment
reflected in the school district's policy.
27
The district court found that the denial of the requested transfers did
not amount to a racially-discriminatory action contrary to the Court's re-
quirements in Brown I and II,2 8 noting that those decisions had not required
local schools to adopt policies designed to affirmatively promote "race mix-
ing.",2 9 The court noted that the school board had conceded that it had pre-
viously operated the schools in a segregated fashion and had not adopted
any policy or plan to desegregate the public schools, despite expressing its
intent to comply with the law and assign students in a racially non-
20. Parham, 271 F.2d at 139.
21. Id. at 140.
22. Dove II, 181 F. Supp. at 510.
23. Id.
24. Parham, 271 F.2d at 140.
25. Judge J. Smith Henley, a native Arkansan, is perhaps best known for his decisions in
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) ("Holt F') and 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970) ("Holt I"), in which he sustained claims that the Arkansas prison system violated
constitutional protections extended to prison inmates, including the prohibition against inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments, and maintenance of racially-discriminatory policies.
Holt II, 309 F. Supp. at 365-66. Judge Henley eloquently wrote: "For the ordinary convict a
sentence to the Arkansas Penitentiary today amounts to a banishment from civilized society
to a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world, a world that is administered by
criminals under unwritten rules and customs completely foreign to free world culture." Id. at
381. For more on Judge Jesse Smith Henley, see generally entry in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ARKANSAS HISTORY AND CULTURE, http://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-
detail.aspx?search= I &entrylD=417 (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
26. Judge Axel Beck, a United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota
from 1958-69, apparently sat on the case by special designation. See The Political Gra-
veyard.com, http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/beck.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2007).
27. For more on Judge Beck's role in the Dollarway desegregation case, see JACK
WALTER PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SOUTHERN
DESEGREGATION 87 (1961).
28. SeeDovell, 181 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
29. Id. at 513.
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discriminatory manner.3° Moreover, it submitted that the Constitution did
not require immediate cessation of all segregation, merely that the local
school district develop a plan to implement integration of the schools.31
And, with respect to the testing upon which the denial of the requested
transfers had been based, the court posited, apparently without any sense of
disingenuity:
And during this transition period it is not unlawful for a school
board to require Negro students desiring to transfer to formerly
all-white schools, or white students desiring to transfer to former-
ly all-Negro schools, to submit to reasonable tests and examina-
tions to determine their fitness for such transfers, even though
such tests and examinations are not required of students of either
race who evidence no desire to change schools.32
Judge Howard was undoubtedly dismayed in reading the district court's
order and in learning that the trial judge really could think that white stu-
dents were lining up at the time to integrate Dollarway's black schools and
almost certainly pleased that if they were, they would face the same battery
of tests and expert evaluations to which his clients had been subjected.33
The court ordered no relief for the individual plaintiffs; instead it per-
mitted the school board additional time to formulate a desegregation plan
against which its performance could be assessed,34 while formally enjoining
30. Id. at 509.
31. Id. at 513.
32. Id. at 513-14 (emphasis added).
33. The court later explained that the mandatory testing process was not evidence of
discriminatory intent:
It has been pointed out that in the preliminary stages of desegregation discrimi-
nation is not to be found in the fact that Negro students desiring to enter formerly
segregated schools are required to take tests and submit to examinations not re-
quired of other students. These plaintiffs were the only ones in the District who
desired to enter an all-white school. Had any white students applied for transfer
to Townsend Park, there is no reason to believe that they would not have been
subjected to the same tests and examinations. The tests, interviews, and examina-
tions were not grueling or severe, and none of the plaintiffs manifested any ob-
jection to them at the trial.
Id. at 519. But, the fact that the plaintiffs did not object to the tests is hardly dispositive of the
question of the school system's intent in requiring the students to take them. Had they ob-
jected to the testing or refused, the school board would have cited that refusal as evidence of
willful non-compliance with the administrative procedure that the court was intent on endors-
ing. More importantly, objection to testing or refusal to take the required tests would have
afforded segregationists an argument that the objection or refusal was itself evidence that the
students were intellectually inferior to white students and that segregation of public education
was, consequently, both desirable and permissible.
34. DovelI, 181 F. Suppat519.
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the school board from continuing to maintain a system of segregated
schools.35 At the same time, the court found that the school board had failed
to take action affirmatively implementing desegregation of the schools.36
And as to Judge Howard's three clients, all students who were denied trans-
fers to all-white schools, the court offered no remedy for past or continuing
discrimination, reasoning:
In reaching its conclusion this Court does not overlook the fact
that its decision means that the oldest of the three plaintiffs, a se-
nior, must complete her high school education at Townsend Park.
However, she has spent her entire school life in that school and its
predecessor, and the evidence shows that she will not suffer edu-
cationwise by finishing out her final year in that institution. Her
personal interest in and desire to attend an integrated school does
not outweigh the larger interests which the Court is required to
consider. Future assignment of the two younger plaintiffs, both of
whom are in the ninth grade, will be subject to further considera-
tion by the Board in the light of whatever acceptable plan it may
be able to evolve.37
Thus, the district court was willing to subordinate the interest of a stu-
dent who had been subjected to admitted discrimination throughout her edu-
cational career, to the school district's claimed interest in establishing a pol-
icy designed to facilitate integration.38
35. Id. at 521 ("In accordance with the mandate of the Court of Appeals an injunction
will be issued commanding the Board to eliminate the compulsory racial segregation which
has heretofore prevailed in the Dollarway District."). At best, this perfunctory endorsement of
injunctive relief required by the Eighth Circuit's opinion, see Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132,
140 (8th Cir. 1959), suggests a reversal from the policy of aggressive enforcement advanced
by Judge Beck in his original opinion in the case. See also supra, note 17, and accompanying
text.
36. The court found:
[I]t has not announced any affirmative policy with regard to the conditions under
which a Negro student will be admitted to Dollarway School. And while it has
adopted a policy against lateral transfers at the higher grade levels, except in un-
usual circumstances, there has been no definite affirmative recognition of the co-
rollary of its policy, which corollary would require a liberal treatment of trans-
fer requests at the lower grade levels. Nor has the Board given any indication of
what it would consider to be "exceptional circumstances" which justify a depar-
ture from its general policy at the higher levels.
Dove 11, 181 F. Supp. at 518.
37. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
38. The district court did find, however, that the school district had improperly consi-
dered the plaintiffs' race as a factor in making the decision to deny the applications for trans-
fer, but apparently concluded that this impermissible use of race as a factor in school assign-
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The court simply reasoned that redressing the legal wrongs done to the
child might actually result itself in injury:
Once a discernible and acceptable transition plan has been worked
out, it may develop that the particular individuals who originally
applied for admission to formerly segregated schools may not
achieve their ends. And, when individual assignments are consi-
dered under such a plan, it seems to the Court that the race of a
student who may desire to be assigned to a particular school may
be considered to a limited extent as one of a number of factors
going into the total equation. Otherwise stated, the Court is of the
view that within limits a school board has the right, during the
transition period, to recognize the fact that the assignment of a
child of one race to a school attended exclusively or predominant-
ly by members of another race may present serious problems for
the child, and that, all factors considered, such an assignment
may not be in the child's best interests, no matter how much it may
be supposed that such an assignment might advance the total in-
terests or aspirations of the race to which the child belongs.
39
Thus, the court rationalized the school system's continuation of sys-
temic discrimination as protective of the individual plaintiffs, suggesting a
paternalistic concern in substituting the judgment of the court and white
public officials, who had admittedly maintained the segregated school sys-
tem, for that of the parents of the children for whose benefit the litigation
had been brought. In so holding, the court more than suggested that the in-
terests of the three children were being sacrificed in the pursuit of the politi-
cal goals of the "race to which [they] belong," in the process, and, by impli-
cation, questioned the integrity of Judge Howard as their attorney.
ment was evidence of willful noncompliance with constitutionally-mandated desegregation.
It concluded:
It is equally clear, however, that the Board considered the race of each of the ap-
plicants and gave that factor some weight in reaching its conclusions. The Court
is not able to say from the record how much weight was given to the race of the
respective applicants, and what the Board's conclusion in any instance would
have been had race been left entirely out of consideration.
The Court is convinced that in performing its functions the Board acted with
subjective good faith and conscientiously tried to avoid what the Board consi-
dered to be unlawful discrimination.
Id. at 520.
39. Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
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Subsequently, the district court accepted and approved the desegrega-
tion plan submitted by the school board. 40 Again, both parties appealed the
district court's disposition to the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the deliberate delay in
which the school board had engaged to forestall desegregation of the Dol-
larway public schools. 4' The court rejected the district court's acceptance of
the belated desegregation plan adopted and filed by the school board and,
similarly, rejected the district's explanations for its hesitance to desegregate
the public schools.42 And it roundly rejected the lower court's paternalistic
observation that denial of transfer might actually have been in the best inter-
ests of the plaintiff schoolchildren, concluding:
Standards of placement cannot be devised or given application to
preserve an existing system of imposed segregation. Nor can edu-
cational principles and theories serve to justify such a result.
These elements, like everything else, are subordinate to and may
not prevent the vindication of constitutional rights. An individual
cannot be deprived of the enjoyment of a constitutional right, be-
cause some governmental organ may believe that it is better for
him and for others that he not have this particular enjoyment. The
judgment as to that and the effects upon himself therefrom are
matters for his own responsibility.
43
Similarly, the circuit court criticized the school board's adoption of a
testing policy for applicants for transfer, piercing the superficial uniformity
of application that the trial court had accepted as non-racially discriminatory
in intent.44 The circuit court discussed the district's adoption of:
[T]he California Mental Maturity Test, the Iowa Silent Reading
Test, the Otis Quick Scoring Test of Mental Ability, the California
Language Tests, the Bell Adjustment Inventory, and other such
things-which, at least in the elementary area of public education,
are new adornments upon the entrance doors to school houses and
class rooms ....
40. Dove v. Parham, 183 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Ark. 1960) ("Dove i'), rev'd, 282 F.2d
256 (8th Cir. 1960). The district court found that the plan "provides a start toward the elimi-
nation of racial discrimination, and that it is sufficient to initiate a transition period." Id. at
393. The plan provided that in general, school assignments for the 1960-1961 school year
would remain the same as for the 1959-1960 school year. Id.
41. Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 259-62 (8th Cir. 1960).
42. Id. at 258.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 260.
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and concluded:
[W]hat the District has done and proposes to continue doing, ap-
plication of these devices is not going to be made to the students
generally of the system but only to such individuals as undertake
to engage in application for a transfer-which in the realities of
the District here simply means, to Negro students seeking to enter
a white school.45
While the court noted the trial court's "careful consideration" of the
elements of the Dollarway school board's plan for desegregation in holding
that the plan provided "a reasonable start" to desegregation, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's characterization of the plan was far less kind: "[A]fter a lapse of six
years, we think a board should be required to come forth with something
more objectively indicative as a program of aim and action than a specula-
tive possibility wrapped in dissuasive qualifications. 46 After a surprisingly
short but intensive period of litigation, the Eighth Circuit finally afforded a
measure of relief to Judge Howard's clients, but not without the delay com-
promising their rights to the vindication promised in Brown I and II. In Dol-
larway, "all deliberate speed" was not at all deliberate.47
The Dollarway litigation demonstrates the frustration that counsel often
face in representing clients in unpopular cases, or when the intransigence of
public officials is reflected in the reluctance of courts to intervene aggres-
sively to protect individual rights.48 This frustration is often accompanied by
45. Id. at 260.
46. Id. at 260, 261. The trial court found that the plan advanced by the board had af-
forded "at least some Negro children entering school for the first time" during the 1960-61
school year "a reasonable chance of being assigned to the heretofore all-white Dollarway
School ..." Id. (citing the district court opinion, Dove v. Parham, 183 F. 389, 392 (E.D. Ark
1960)). The district court predicated its conclusion on the premise that the plan would be
applied in "good faith." Id.
47. Dove, 282 F.2d at 261. The lack of commitment to the promise of desegregation was
not confined to the Dollarway experience. The 1963 report of the Arkansas Advisory Com-
mittee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Public Education in Arkansas: Still
Separate and Still Unequal (September, 1963) [hereinafter 1963 Advisory Committee Re-
port] showed that Negro high schools suffered in comparison to all-white high schools in
terms of accreditation surveyed by the North Central Accrediting Association in 1961-62,
with the majority of minority schools trailing majority schools significantly. 1963 Advisory
Committee Report at 9-11, available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/crl2ar4.pdf (last visited Aug. 27,
2007). Overall, the rate of integration of public schools in 1963 was dismal, with only .211%
of black students attending integrated schools, justifying a conclusion that Arkansas had
resisted compliance with Brown. 1963 Advisory Committee Report at 8.
48. The 1963 Advisory Committee Report discloses that the Dollarway litigation re-
sulted in seven court decisions resulting in the enrollment of only two Negro students in
formerly segregated, all white schools. 1963 Advisory Committee Report at 22, n.5 1. The
2008]
UALR LAW REVIEW
a profound sense of failure when the litigation ultimately proves unsuccess-
ful and the case is lost. But even in victories, such as Judge Howard
achieved in Dollarway, there is often personal pain. While denying relief to
his clients in the second round of litigation, the federal district court ad-
dressed the violence against African Americans attending the desegregation
effort. In its opinion, the court noted that this violence occurred during the
school board hearing on the plaintiffs' applications to transfer to previously
all-white schools. 49 It reported on the extent of violence:
The evidence reflected that the hearing before the Board was
marred by a disturbance created outside the school by a crowd of
white people whose presence there may well have been in part
coincidental as a football game was being played nearby on the
same night the hearing was held. This disturbance was marked by
abusive language hurled at the Negroes present at the hearing, by
the throwing of bottles in the halls of the Dollarway School, by
the breaking of windows, and by some physical violence, fortu-
nately not serious, directed at the persons of some of the Negroes
as they left the school.5°
Judge Howard was subjected to personal indignities and threats upon
returning to Pine Bluff in assuming the burden as counsel for many clients
who had suffered the direct effects of racial discrimination, as reflected in
the Dollarway desegregation litigation. He also suffered the experience of
his family being subjected to abuse. His family was intimately involved in
the integration of Pine Bluff public schools. In 1963, for instance, in one
particularly frightening episode, his daughter, Sarah, a Dollarway High
School student,5' and a second-grader were attacked by white students who
pelted the car within which they rode with stones." Certainly, for a lawyer
trained to seek recourse for wrongs in the courts, the inability of the law to
fully control violence must have proved difficult for him, precisely because
Advisory Committee concluded, in part: "There has been no significant progress in the past
decade toward the elimination of established substantial inequality between educational op-
portunity for white and Negro children; both tangible inequality of physical resources and
intangible inequality through segregation persist." Id. at 26.
49. Dove 11, 181 F. Supp. at 520. The hearing date was October 8, 1959. Id. at 510.
50. Id.at521.
51. Dollarway Re-opens; Negroes Are Absent, PINE BLUFF COM., Jan. 24, 1963, at 1.
Sarah Howard Jenkins returned to Arkansas after practicing with the firm of Lewis and Roca
in Phoenix and teaching at the University of Memphis. Sarah, a nationally-known expert in
the fields of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, now serves as the Charles C.
Baum Distinguished Professor of Law at the UALR William H. Bowen School of Law.
52. Mob Stones Car Carrying Student, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER (Daily Edition), Jan. 23,
1963, at 5.
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his faith in the law prevented him from resorting to violence in response,
even for the protection of his own children.53
B. Continuing the Push for Equality
Judge Howard's responsibilities as a leader of the civil rights move-
ment in Pine Bluff and lawyer for the politically oppressed were not limited
to efforts in desegregating the public schools. In 1963, for instance, Judge
Howard was hired by the families of ten young African Americans arrested
for demonstrating against segregation at a Pine Bluff movie theater and
would thereafter be retained by the NAACP to represent all forty-four de-
fendants, who were then being held in a jail designed to hold only thirty
individuals.54 The following year he represented comedian Dick Gregory
and a fellow demonstrator who were arrested in Pine Bluff and fined for
refusing to leave a segregated truck stop.
55
In practice, George Howard, Jr. demonstrated his ability as a creative
and persistent attorney, especially in defending individuals in the criminal
courts. In the 1960s he litigated issues that foreshadowed later holdings of
the Supreme Court. He challenged the imposition of the death penalty for
rape in Maxwell v. Stephens56 and Harris v. Stephens,57 demonstrating that
its use had been systematically directed against black defendants charged
with the rape of white women. Judge Howard also argued that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty for rape violated the prohibition against infliction
of cruel and unusual punishment.58 Although the Eighth Circuit rejected the
53. Judge Howard's brother, William Howard, drove to school to pick up the two child-
ren. According to the local newspaper story, he reportedly heard the car being hit by some-
thing and proceeded to investigate. Apparently, a white youth assaulted him and he respond-
ed by defending himself with a pocket knife that he used as a tool in his work as a mechanic,
leading to his arrest by four sheriff's deputies after he walked to a nearby business and asked
to use the phone to call his insurance company and the FBI. Howard was charged with assault
with intent to kill. Dollarway Re-opens, supra note 51. This incident was misreported by
Holly Y. McGee in It Was the Wrong Time, and They Just Weren't Ready: Direct Action
Protest in Pine Bluff, 1963, LXVI ARK. HIST. Q. 18, 22 (Spring 2007), which stated that
"George Howard" had been arrested in an incident after a white student had thrown a brick
through the windshield of his car in which his "niece, Sarah," was riding. Considering Judge
Howard's personal reputation for deference to the rule of law and civility, this mis-
identification is particularly unfortunate.
54. 44 Stand-Ins Held in Jail Built for 30, Cn. DAILY DEFENDER (Daily Edition), Apr. 1,
1963, at 4.
55. Dick Gregory Files Appeal, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER (Daily Edition), Feb. 27, 1964, at
4.
56. 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965).
57. 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966).
58. Maxwell, 348 F.2d at 330; Harris, 361 F.2d at 894-95. The panel decision rejecting
Judge Howard's Eighth Amendment arguments in Maxwell was written by then-Judge Harry
Blackmun, who was later appointed to the United States Supreme Court by President Richard
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argument and supporting statistical evidence, the Supreme Court voided the
use of the death penalty as a punishment for the rape of an adult woman in
Coker v. Georgia.59
He consistently raised issues concerning the fairness of criminal jury
trials in which most minority venirepersons were excluded through discri-
minatory juror selection procedures. 60 For instance, he challenged racial
discrimination in jury selection as well as the application of the death penal-
ty for rape in Maxwell v. Stephens,61 a case ultimately leading to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Maxwell v. Bishop,62 holding that improper exclu-
sion of a prospective juror in a capital case based on their opposition to the
death penalty requires reversal of the death sentence. 63 There, the Court ap-
plied its decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois64 to Maxwell's death sentence,
which had been imposed before Witherspoon was announced to vacate the
denial of habeas relief.65 Judge Howard continued to represent Maxwell as
co-counsel in a second federal habeas petition.66
M. Nixon. Justice Blackmun dissented from the plurality holding invalidating existing death
penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972), but in Callins v. Collins,
510 U.S. 1141 (1994), he dissented from the denial of certiorari, explaining that he found the
death penalty constitutionally flawed in its implementation. In Collins, Justice Blackmum
recalled that he had enforced the death penalty as a circuit judge, citing the decision in Max-
well, among others, while expressing public reservations about "its moral, social, and consti-
tutional legitimacy." Callins. 510 U.S. at 1145, n.1. He wrote: "From this day forward, I no
longer shall tinker with the machinery of death." Id. at 1145.
59. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Coker was foreshadowed by the dissent from the denial of
certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), in which Justice Goldberg, joined by
Justices Douglas and Brennan, argued that certiorari should be granted to consider whether
the infliction of death for a "rapist who had neither taken nor endangered human life" violates
the prohibition on infliction of a cruel and unusual punishment. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889-90.
60. See, e.g, Trotter v. State, 237 Ark. 820, 831, 835-38, 377 S.W.2d 14, 21, 23-25
(1964) (rejecting challenge to failure to empanel venire representative of community demo-
graphics, suggesting claim defaulted by counsel's failure to exhaust peremptory challenges, a
wholly inapplicable ground for default since a challenge based on exclusion of minority
jurors from jury venire cannot be addressed through use of peremptory challenges in any
event); see also Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F. Supp. 33, 42-44 (E.D. Ark. 1965). The state and
federal courts in Trotter also rejected arguments that imposition of the death penalty against
black defendants for rape of white women violated due process and the prohibition against
infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. See also Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d at 891-92
(rejecting claim that jury formation process resulted in under-representation of minority ju-
rors).
61. 348 F.2d. at 332-34.
62. 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
63. Id. at 266.
64. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
65. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968). Once again, then-Judge Blackmun wrote the circuit's
panel opinion denying relief. Id. at 139.
66. Judge Howard worked as a cooperating attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund on the Maxwell case. On May 2, 1970, the CHI. DAILY DEFENDER (Weekend Edition),
included a short news item, Ready for Countdown, and a photograph of Judge Howard con-
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In Harris, his complaint to the closing of the courtroom to spectators
during the examination of the complaining witness was dismissed as "spu-
rious" by the court of appeals.67 Some forty years later, in United States v.
Thunder,68 the circuit court addressed a similar claim as substantial and re-
versed the conviction 69 when the defendant complained that closure of the
courtroom during the testimony of minor complainants in a child sex abuse
prosecution 70 violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.7'
In Sheppard v. State,72 he argued that the defendant's commitment to
the state hospital and Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of forty-five demonstrated
that his confession was not freely and voluntarily given.73 The defendant had
been sentenced to death for murder committed during the commission of a
rape, and Judge Howard entered the case after the trial had concluded.74 The
state court, however, rejected his argument that the defendant was so im-
paired that his decision to waive counsel and give a statement inculpating
himself should not be held against him. Four decades later, Arkansas law75
and United States Supreme Court precedent 76 would have barred imposition
of the death penalty because of his established mental deficiency.77 The span
of Judge Howard's career in practice and on the bench serves to demonstrate
the often dramatic shifts in constitutional interpretation that have marked the
development of constitutional criminal procedure. While the Court's deci-
sion in Atkins in 2002 would presumably have saved Sheppard from the
death penalty, only thirteen years earlier, in 1989, the Court rejected the
argument that execution of a mentally retarded individual would necessarily
violate the Constitution.78
ferring with his client William L. Maxwell, who was reportedly suffering from tuberculosis
and then confined to a hospital.
67. Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d at 891.
68. 438 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2006).
69. Id. at 868.
70. Id. at 866.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72. 239 Ark. 785, 394 S.W.2d 624 (1965).
73. Id. at 790-91, 394 S.W.2d at 627-28. An expert, who evaluated the defendant while
he was confined at the Arkansas State Hospital, put the defendant's mental age between nine
and ten years old. Id. Evaluating experts concluded that he was not so impaired as to lack
responsibility based upon mental defect. Id.
74. Id. at 789, 394 S.W.2d at 626.
75. Arkansas code section 5-4-618(a)(2) establishes a rebuttable presumption of mental
retardation barring execution under subsection (b) based on an IQ test result of sixty-five (65)
or below. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(a)(2).
76. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 335 (2002).
77. In Sheppard, even the highest reported IQ performance for the defendant was fifty-
nine, although the testifying expert explained that his deficient mental age, as an adult, dem-
onstrated less impairment than would be expected of a child functioning at a ten year old age
level. Sheppard, 239 Ark. at 791, 394 S.W.2d at 627.
78. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
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Throughout his career in practice, Judge Howard worked as local coun-
sel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in capital cases and civil litigation,
including Shelton v. Tucker,79 challenging state law requiring teachers to
disclose their memberships in political organizations.8°
As a practitioner, Judge Howard litigated skillfully, while often suffer-
ing the experience of losing difficult cases while advancing novel claims or
arguments. Yet the history of constitutional litigation demonstrates that the
kinds of claims he was raising in the 1960s would ultimately be recognized
as compelling by the Supreme Court a decade later. And, later, as a judge of
long service, he lived to see some of his best work undone by later courts.
III. THE HARDWORKING AND COURTEOUS JURIST
Judge Howard's record of public service on the bench is unparalleled
in Arkansas history. 8' He was appointed to the Arkansas Supreme Court by
Governor David Pryor in 1977 and to the newly-created Arkansas Court of
Appeals by then-Governor Bill Clinton in 1979. He was the first African
American to serve on these courts, just as he had been the first to serve on
the Arkansas Claims Commission, from 1969 to 1977, including serving as
its Chairman. And he was the first African American to serve on the federal
bench in Arkansas as a result of his appointment by President Jimmy Carter
as United States District Judge in 1980.82 As a federal judge for over a quar-
ter of a century, his reputation as a hard-working and courteous jurist was
well-known. He served his community and the nation with the same degree
of dedication to principle as a defender of the Constitution and with his eyes
firmly fixed on justice that he brought to bear as a lawyer in Pine Bluff and
public servant before his appointment to the District bench.
In 1977, as a member of the Arkansas Supreme Court, he wrote the
opinion in Sanders v. State,83 upholding the warrant requirement for person-
al luggage seized from an automobile where police had probable cause to
believe that the suitcase contained contraband. His reasoning was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court two years later in Arkansas v. Sand-
79. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The Arkansas statute under attack required public school
teachers to disclose information about all personal memberships in organizations, including
church affiliation, and all associational activities, as a prerequisite for employment. Id. at
480-81, 487-88. The statute was struck down as an unconstitutional infringement on associa-
tion by a 5-4 vote. Id. at 490.
80. See Appellant's Statement as to Jurisdiction, Shelton v. McKinney, 1959 WL
101548 (listing Judge Howard as "Of Counsel").
81. He is the only individual to have served on the Arkansas Court of Appeals, Arkansas
Supreme Court, and United States District Court.
82. Judge Howard succeeded Judge Richard S. Arnold, who was elevated to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit by President Carter.
83. 262 Ark. 595,600-01, 559 S.W.2d 704, 706-07 (1977), aff'd, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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ers,84 a principle which stood for years until undermined by United States v.
Ross,85 which expanded the automobile search exception, and finally by the
Court's decision in California v. Acevedo86 in 1991, abandoning the consti-
tutional requirement for search warrants for personal property seized by
police.
During his tenure on the federal bench for the Eastern District of Ar-
kansas, Judge Howard presided over some of the most highly publicized
trials in the state's history, including the Whitewater prosecution conducted
by Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr.87 He ordered the deposition of then-
President Bill Clinton as a critical witness in the Whitewater prosecution of
the President's former business partners.88 His refusal to order release of the
videotape to news media was upheld by the Eighth Circuit. 89 He presided
over the trial in which then-Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker 90 and Jim9'
and Susan McDouga192 were convicted. And, subsequently, he presided over
the trial of Susan McDougal, charged with obstruction of justice for her re-
fusal to testify before the Whitewater grand jury investigating the business
affairs of President Clinton and now-Senator Hillary Clinton.93
84. 442 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1979), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991).
85. 456 U.S. 798, 812-14, 824 (1982).
86. 500 U.S. 565, 573-78 (1991).
87. See generally WashingtonPost.com, Dan Froomkin, Untangling Whitewater,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/whitewater/whitewater.htm (last
visited Aug. 27, 2007); N.Y. TIMES, Times Topics,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/w/whitewater-case/index.htm?q
uery=HOWARD,%20GEORGE%20JR&field=per&match=exact (last visited Aug. 27,
2007).
88. Bryan Knowlton, President Will Appear in Court, Mostly Likely on Videotape, INT'L
HERALD TRiB., Feb. 7, 1996, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/1996/02/07/white.t_0.php.
89. United States v. McDougal, 92 F.3d 701, 103 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 1996), aff'd 940 F.
Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (granting protective order sought by President Clinton to restrict
access to videotape deposition). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Citizens
United v. United States, 522 U.S. 809 (1997).
90. United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1998), remanding for evidentiary
hearing, 137 F.2d 1016, reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (E.D. Ark.
1999) (denying motion for new trial), 243 F.3d 499 (8th Cir. 2001), aff'd conviction. Judge
Howard also presided over Tucker's petition for post-conviction relief, denying relief. Tucker
v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (E.D. Ark. 2003).
91. United States v. James B. McDougal, 133 F.3d 1110 (8th Cir. 1998).
92. United States v. Susan H. McDougal, 137 F.3d 547 (8th Cir. 1998).
93. Susan McDougal had already been held in contempt of court for her refusal to testify
by then-Chief Judge Susan Webber Wright. Judge Wright's order was upheld on appeal. In
re: Grand Jury Subpoena, 97 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 1996). McDougal was then prosecut-
ed by the Whitewater Special Prosecutor, Kenneth Starr, and the case was tried by Judge
Howard. See, e.g., McDougal Jury Deliberations to Resume Monday,
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/09/mcdougal/ accessed (last visited
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Judge Howard also issued important decisions in election cases focus-
ing on candidate access to the ballot. In Citizens to Establish a Reform Party
in Arkansas v. Priest,94 he concluded that a state law 95 that set an arbitrarily
early date for qualification of a political party based on production of peti-
tions containing signatures of registered voters equivalent to at least 3% of
the lesser number of votes cast for the office of governor or presidential
electors in the preceding election unreasonably burdened third parties seek-
ing places on the general election ballot.96 The requirement constituted a
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 97 he wrote in assessing
the early date for qualification, because:
Early filing deadlines such as the one herein at issue unduly hind-
er, if not bar, minor political parties from influencing the electoral
process by ballot access. Only in the election year itself do issues
begin to coalesce such that minority parties with opposing or dif-
ferent views may emerge. At such an early point in the election
year, it is often difficult to get volunteers from the voting public to
become involved in the petition collection process.98
As new political parties continued their struggle for recognition and growth,
fighting the framework of a system once controlled by a single party and
now clearly in the grip of two parties, Judge Howard continued to support
ballot access to reflect these movements.
In Green Party of Arkansas v. Priest,99 he responded to a complaint
filed by the Green Party that its candidate for a special election for the Third
Aug. 23, 2007) (reporting Judge Howard proceeded with jury deliberations after questioning
juror challenged for bringing a law book to court); Trial Judge Curbs McDougal's Defense,
N.Y. TIMES Apr. 7, 1999, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A02E3D81638F934A35757COA96F958260
&n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FPeople%2FM%2FMcDougal%2C%2OSus
an (reporting Judge Howard limited jury consideration of Susan McDougal's claim that her
prosecution for contempt was based on her refusal to commit perjury before Whitewater
grand jury to one of three counts). Susan McDougal was convicted on four counts, including
mail fraud, in the Whitewater trial. McDougal, 137 F.3d at 549-50. She was acquitted on one
count in the obstruction trial and the prosecution elected not to proceed when the jury hung as
to the other counts. See Froomkin, supra note 87; see, e.g., McDougal Jubilant After Jury
Finds Her Not Guilty, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/11/24/mcdougal.01/
(last visited Aug. 23, 2007).
94. 970 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
95. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-101.
96. Reform Party, 970 F. Supp. at 696.
97. Id. at 696-97.
98. Id. at 698.
99. 159 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (E.D. Ark. 2001).
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Congressional District 00 was being denied access to the ballot with his party
designation.' ' Relying on its earlier decision in the Reform Party case, the
court again held that the state could require no greater number of registered
voters petitioning for party recognition than the 10,000 signatures required
for inclusion of an individual on the ballot. 0 2 But for purposes of the special
election, he also found that state law governing the collection of signatures
imposed time limitations and deadlines for petitioning for party recognition
that rendered qualification for the special election impossible. 0 3 Finding
First and Fourteenth Amendment violations in the operation of the overly-
restrictive party recognition regime, he enjoined the Secretary of State from
excluding the Green Party candidate from the special election ballot.
1°4
Most recently, in Green Party of Arkansas v. Daniels,'0 5 the judge was
once again presented with a question of ballot qualification relating to the
3% signature requirement under state law.' 0 6 He found the 3% requirement
for recognition of a political party was not "narrowly drawn to serve a com-
pelling state interest,"' 1 7 instead finding that the 10,000 signature require-
ment for independent candidates demonstrated "a sufficient modicum of
support to serve the state's interest in avoiding cluttered ballots."'0 8 Once
again, he enjoined the Secretary of State from refusing the recognize the
Green Party and ordered inclusion of its candidates on the ballot for the
2006 election.'
0 9
Judge Howard's disposition in the ballot access cases may have reflect-
ed, in part, a belief in openness in the democratic process that had eluded
him as a practitioner vigorously representing individual litigants against
politically entrenched institutions. Or perhaps it reflected a faith in the fun-
damental efficacy of a democracy in promoting citizenship, just as his career
had been built on a faith that the courts and the rule of law would protect the
100. Id. at 1141. The vacancy arose when Representative Asa Hutchinson resigned the
seat upon his appointment to serve as Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion.
101. Id. at 1142.
102. Id. (citing Citizens to Establish a Reform Party in Arkansas v. Priest, 970 F. Supp. at
699).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1145.
105. 445 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
106. Id. at 1058. Under Arkansas code section 7-7-205(a), a political party must demon-
strate support equivalent to 3% of the lesser of the total number of votes cast for governor or
presidential electors in the preceding election to obtain recognition for purposes of listing its
candidates as representing the party on the election ballot. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-205(a)
(LEXIS 2006).
107. Green Party, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1063.
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rights of all citizens, especially those without political influence or econom-
ic power.
IV. CONCLUSION
In reflecting on Judge Howard's career, it is his work as an advocate
that is perhaps most inspiring. He knew the frustration of litigating zealously
and losing. And yet, he persisted. What no lawyer of a younger generation
can likely share with Judge Howard, of course, is the life experience of an
African American lawyer returning to his hometown to raise his family and
build a practice in the throes of the unrest of the civil rights movement. Only
his family can likely understand the full extent of his personal courage and
commitment, the incredible pressures to which they were subjected, and
their resolve to stand with him, and he with them, in the pursuit of justice.
And in their love and the faith which now sustains them, he undoubtedly
found the source of his great strength.
With his death, the Arkansas delegation to the United States Congress
initiated and supported legislation to rename the United States Courthouse
in Pine Bluff in Judge Howard's honor,110 an altogether fitting designation
for a lawyer who devoted his professional life to the Constitution.
110. George Howard, Jr. Federal Building and United States Courthouse-Designation,
Pub. L. No. 110-159, 121 Stat. 1838 (2007). See Allison Hogue, Bill to Rename Pine Bluff
Federal Building and Courthouse Passes House, June 25, 2007,
http://arkansasmatters.com/content/fulltext/?cid=57064. The legislation was introduced by
United States Representative Mike Ross (D), who represented Judge Howard's home district
in the House. Id.
[Vol. 30
